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 Our system of intellectual property (IP) law effectively stimulates the creation and 
distribution of information and information-rich products that are vital to economic 
growth and well-being. Unfortunately, the system also promotes harmful rent-seeking by 
owners of IP rights who undertake opportunistic and anti-competitive lawsuits. Some IP 
owners value their property right chiefly as a “ticket” into court that gives them a credible 
threat to sue vulnerable IP users.1 Socially harmful IP litigation is common because the 
rights are easy to get and potentially apply quite broadly, and the problem is growing 
worse because of the expansion of the scope and strength of IP law.2 This Article 
addresses rent-seeking that arises when a party seeks to enforce an IP right that is 
probably invalid or seeks to stretch a valid right to cover activities outside the proper 
scope of the right. Such rent-seeking costs can be controlled by (1) reducing the risk that 
parties will acquire invalid IP rights, (2) making the scope of rights clearer, and (3) using 
a mix of procedural and substantive measures that mitigate the harm caused by lawsuits 
based on vague or invalid rights. 
                                                 
1 “[The patent] system gives you a government grant which is little more than a right to litigate[.]” An 
Interview with Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager, J. Proprietary Rts., Dec. 1993, at x (objecting to the weakness of 
patent rights). 
2 Sui generis laws have been proposed or enacted to cover “products as diverse as semiconductor chips, 
databases, industrial design, artistic performances, and genetic maps…” Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane 
Leenheer Zimmerman, & Harry First, Introduction, Expanding the Bounds of Intellectual Property x 
(2001); Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain: Markets in Information Versus the 
Marketplace of Ideas, Expanding the Bounds of Intellectual Property, eds. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, & Harry First, 270 (2001); (“[The belief] that more property rights 
necessarily lead to the production of more, and more diverse, information … has been used in varying 
degrees to justify a phenomenal expansion of intellectual property rights in sundry directions over the past 
few years.”); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 
88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2239 (2000) (“The belief that economic policy should be grounded in a 
competitive baseline is starting to give way to a notion that all sorts of intangibles deserve protection from 
some form of property law.”). 
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 Courts and commentators recognized a similar problem in the antitrust realm.3 
Antitrust law is supposed to promote competition, but it can be used by a plaintiff as a 
device to exclude competitors or to extract a wrongful settlement payment.4 Some 
antitrust plaintiffs bring suits hoping the courts will mistakenly block activities that 
increase the efficiency of the plaintiffs’ competitors.5 Antitrust law responded6 by: 
crafting standing rules that exclude plaintiffs who are not likely to be good “private 
attorneys general;”7 clarifying vague antitrust criteria so defendants can avoid the risk of 
anti-competitive suit;8 and easing summary judgment requirements for antitrust 
defendants in certain circumstances to discourage opportunistic lawsuits.9 
 IP law needs to follow the same path as antitrust law — take stronger substantive 
and procedural steps to mitigate the harm from rent-seeking through litigation. Part I of 
this Article defines opportunistic and anti-competitive IP lawsuits, and explains when 
they are credible. Parts II and III show certain pre-trial and post-trial measures help 
control socially harmful litigation by undercutting the credibility of such lawsuits. Better 
control is possible if trial judges are more vigilant and use their discretion to restrict the 
availability of preliminary injunctions and award attorneys fees to defendants in 
opportunistic and anti-competitive cases. Control can be further enhanced by encouraging 
declaratory judgments and summary judgments in favor of defendants. There is also a 
                                                 
3 William J. Baumol & Janus A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J. Law & Econ. 247, 
250-51 (1985) (“the social costs of rent-seeking protectionism can be very high”). 
4 Id. at 252-53 (treble damages encourage rent-seeking though they also play a desirable deterrent role). 
5 For example, Chrysler challenged a GM-Toyota joint venture. Chrysler’s incentives were exactly the 
opposite of the social welfare goals — Chrysler would oppose a joint venture that created socially desirable 
productive efficiency for GM and Toyota because that would hurt Chrysler, and Chrysler would favor a 
joint venture that caused a socially harmful output restriction because that would help Chrysler. Id. at 256-
57. 
6 Whether these responses were good policy is open to debate. Measures that control rent-seeking litigation 
sometimes discourage too much socially desirable litigation. 
7 Antitrust injury doctrine. Brunswick. Cargill. 
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limited role for antitrust judgments against anti-competitive plaintiffs. Part IV identifies 
certain IP rights that should be trimmed through a reduction in scope and strength. The 
most encouraging developments on this front are the Supreme Court’s efforts to restrict 
trade dress protection, and the Federal Circuit’s efforts to restrict the scope and increase 
the clarity of patent claims. Contraction of certain IP rights is a desirable complement to 
ex post control measures that are never completely effective.10 
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF OPPORTUNISTIC AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWSUITS 
A. Weak Lawsuits and Credible Threats 
 A lawsuit is weak if the objective probability of successfully proving 
infringement is low at the time of filing. The probability of success is evaluated using the 
knowledge of a hypothetical plaintiff who files after conducting a reasonable 
investigation.11 The probability of success may be low because the right asserted likely 
does not cover the defendant’s behavior or because the right is unlikely to be valid. A 
weak lawsuit is anti-competitive12 if the defendant’s alleged infringing behavior occurs in 
a market the plaintiff participates in or intends to enter; otherwise a weak lawsuit is 
opportunistic. 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 See cite; cf. Baumol & Ordover, supra note 4, at 254. 
9 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88, 597 (1986). 
10 See Merges, supra note 3, at 2190-91 (“There is a fine line … between a meritorious property right and 
an odious government enforced rent.”)  
11 Compare Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 519, 533 (1997); (A lawsuit is 
frivolous “(1) when a plaintiff files knowing facts that establish complete (or virtually complete) absence of 
merit as an objective matter on the legal theories alleged, or (2) when a plaintiff files without conducting a 
reasonable investigation which, if conducted, would place the lawsuit in prong (1).”) 
12 One might consider every intellectual property lawsuit against a competitor to be anti-competitive 
because exclusionary remedies are available to successful plaintiffs. That would be simplistic because it 
ignores the incentive effect produced by the profit derived from the exclusionary power of intellectual 
property. Nevertheless, the label anti-competitive might be appropriate when applied to strong claims that 
are derived from an underlying intellectual property law that is overly protective. Regardless of the 
appropriate label, those issues are outside the scope of this Article.  
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 A plaintiff usually files an anti-competitive lawsuit seeking to impair the 
defendant’s performance in their shared market or even to exclude the defendant from the 
market completely;13 a plaintiff files an opportunistic lawsuit seeking a settlement 
payment.14 Opportunistic and anti-competitive lawsuits are initially puzzling because it is 
hard to see why defendants would yield to the threat of weak suit. The puzzle can be 
solved by explaining why a defendant rationally believes a plaintiff with a weak lawsuit 
would actually prosecute the lawsuit through trial. There are three main reasons weak IP 
lawsuits are credible.15 
 First, the scope of IP rights is highly variable. Reasonable judges often disagree 
on the interpretation of a patent claim. The standard for trademark infringement, 
likelihood of consumer confusion, is inherently noisy. Copyright law asks the fact-finder 
                                                 
13 This Article does not address the problem of intellectual property licenses designed to cartelize a market. 
One goal of this Article is to understand how to control anti-competitive litigation by structuring the law to 
reduce the credibility of weak intellectual property lawsuits. Licenses that facilitate cartels do not depend 
on the credibility of the threat to sue; strong, weak, or sham rights can all be used to disguise collusion. 
Therefore, the control measures discussed in this Article are not targeted at the problem of collusion. 
14 Lawyers and economists have devoted significant attention to the problem of opportunistic lawsuits; they 
have developed a variety of theories to explain such suits, and a variety of policy recommendations to 
control them. See e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their 
Nuisance Value, 5 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3 (1985); Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18 Rand 
J. Econ. 198 (1987); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Suits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 Int'l Rev. 
L. & Econ. 3 (1990); Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation, 20 Rand J. 
Econ. 183 (1989); Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in 
Litigation, 1993 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 75 (1993); Bone, supra note 12; Chris Guthrie, Framing 
Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 163 (2000). Most of the literature 
discusses opportunistic suits in the context of tort, civil rights, or shareholder derivative suits. See e.g., 
Bone, supra note 12, at x. 
15 A lawsuit may also be credible when the plaintiff fails to adequately investigate the defendant’s conduct. 
See Bone, supra note 12, at 550-66. Weak patent and trade dress lawsuits arise when plaintiffs fail to 
examine defendants’ products to see if they are colorably infringing. See e.g., Ferraris Medical, Inc., v. 
Azimuth Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13589 (unpublished opinion) (D.N.H. 2002) (In a trade dress 
infringement case the court concluded “that neither Ferraris nor its legal counsel adequately investigated 
the facts.”); Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversing the Court of Federal Claims 
and insisting that a Rule 11 sanction should be applied to a patent owner who only observed an allegedly 
infringing device from a distance); Loctite Corp. v. Fel-Pro, 667 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1981) (expert testing 
required before filing a patent infringement lawsuit in a case involving a sophisticated technology). A 
relatively uninformed plaintiff can credibly prosecute a weak lawsuit until litigation has moved far enough 
along that the defendant has a chance to show that given the broadest plausible scope of the plaintiff’s IP 
right, the defendant’s action fall outside that scope. 
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to make a difficult subjective decision whether the defendant unlawfully appropriated the 
plaintiff’s expressive work. Besides vague standards for infringement, trials often feature 
conflicting expert testimony about matters relevant to the scope of an IP right. 
Compounding these problems is the risk of error by judges and juries. Trial errors are 
difficult to dispel in IP litigation,16 because the complexity of the evidence can make it 
difficult for a deserving defendant to win a summary judgment or even prevail at trial.17 
High variance in the scope of rights makes it profitable for IP plaintiffs with apparently 
narrow rights to gamble the court will grant them broad rights. A common strategy used 
in opportunistic e-commerce lawsuits is to dust off a pre-Internet patent and argue the 
patent claims extend to cover the Internet.18 
                                                 
16 A weak lawsuit is credible if the court is likely to err in favor of the plaintiff. Even though the defendant 
recognizes that she should win at trial, if the risk of error is high enough, then the plaintiff holds a credible 
threat. Risk of trial error is not a plausible explanation of weak lawsuits in some areas of the law, because a 
defendant likely could win a summary judgment and defeat the lawsuit at an early stage of litigation at a 
relatively low cost. See Bone, supra note 12, at 534-37 (nuisance suits based on trial error are uncommon). 
For example, if a tort defendant has proof that an opportunistic plaintiff was injured by some cause 
unrelated to the defendant, then the lawsuit is not credible because it would be easy to share that evidence 
with a court. 
17 Robert C. Nissen, The Art of the Counterclaim: Festo Won’t End Frivolous Infringement Cases, But It 
Does Make It Easier to Fight Back, LEGAL TIMES, May 7, 2001, 64 (“Defending against frivolous 
infringement allegations can be a nightmare. At best, after spending hundreds of thousands or even millions 
of dollars, a defendant is restored to the position it held before the case was filed. At worst, a defendant is 
found liable because the jury was bewildered by the complex technologies at issue.”) 
18 See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 231 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (allows patent 
owner to try to show that pre-Internet claim language applies to the Internet retail transactions); Brad King, 
Want Video on Demand? Press Pause, Wired News, Sep. 11, 2002, available at: 
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,55026,00.html (a company owning a 1992 patent covering 
video on demand is seeking a license from MovieLink, a joint venture of five movie studios that delivers 
movies over the Internet) (the patent owner has broad claim language in the patent the might be construed 
to cover Internet delivery) Brenda Sandburg, The Recorder, Closely Watched Hyperlink Patent Case 
Tossed, Law.com (Aug. 23, 2002) available at: 
http://www.law.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/View&c=LawArticle&cid=
1029689057140&t=LawArticleTech (the district court judge ruled that a BT patent covering access to text-
based information over a telephone network did not cover hyper-linking on the Internet, British 
Telecommunications Inc. v. Prodigy Communications Corp., 00-9451) (BT hoped to get hundreds of 
millions of dollars in royalties). These claims have some plausibility because the doctrine of equivalents 
has been used to expand patent rights beyond literal claim language in cases of later developed technology. 
For example, patent scope has been expanded in response to the unforeseen development of micro-
computers. 
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 Second, a weak lawsuit may present a credible threat to a defendant who has 
trouble distinguishing weak lawsuits from strong ones.19 A plaintiff with a weak lawsuit 
can successfully bluff a defendant because at early stages of IP litigation the plaintiff is 
likely to have better information about the scope and validity of the intellectual property. 
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.20 illustrates the 
role of asymmetric information in making weak lawsuits credible. Food Machinery 
obtained a patent on a sewage treatment process by fraudulently concealing information 
that the process had been used in public more than one year before the filing of a patent 
application. Food Machinery filed a patent infringement lawsuit when Walker entered the 
market. Walker uncovered evidence of the prior use and proved the patent was invalid, 
thus Food Machinery failed in its attempt to bluff Walker out of the market. It seems 
likely that many similar attempts succeed in deterring entry or forcing a restrictive license 
onto an entrant; but we have no way to observe successful bluffs.21 
Finally, a weak lawsuit may be credible because of the costs it may impose on the 
defendant. A defendant may settle an opportunistic lawsuit to avoid the nuisance of 
mounting a defense.22 A defendant may settle an anti-competitive suit because the cost of 
                                                 
19 For a model of patent litigation in which plaintiffs with weak claims can successfully bluff their way to a 
settlement payment see Michael J. Meurer, Patent Litigation and Licensing, 20 RAND J. ECON. 77 (1989). 
For a discussion of this type of model outside the intellectual property context see Bone, supra note 12, at 
542-549; Guthrie, supra note 15, at 174 (“frivolous litigation is most likely to occur under conditions of 
asymmetric information”). 
20 382 US 172 (1965). 
21 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF, 347 (1978) 
(expressing concern about the threat of predation through Walker Process fraud); Gary Myers, Litigation as 
a Predatory Practice, 80 KY. L.J. 565, 594 (1992) (litigation can be used to prevent or delay a competitor’s 
entry into a market); SETH SHULMAN, OWNING THE FUTURE 68 (1999) (quoting Richard Stallman who 
disparaged the current state of software patents: “An invalid patent is a dangerous weapon.”); Mark A. 
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. L. Rev. 1495, 1515 (2001) (describing social 
costs of “bad” patents). 
22 See e.g., Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 15, at x; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the 
Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996). Bone argues this approach does not 
explain large nuisance settlement payments. The magnitude of the settlement payment in these models 
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a defense threatens the defendant’s solvency.23 Alternatively, the threat of a weak lawsuit 
may deter entry into a market if the plaintiff establishes a reputation for prosecuting weak 
suits through to the end.24 A plaintiff with a predatory reputation rationally views losing a 
weak lawsuit as a profitable investment in his reputation.25 
Predatory theories of monopolization have fallen out of favor in antitrust law; the 
Supreme Court skeptically stated that predatory pricing is nearly always irrational.26 Such 
skepticism is not warranted though because recent economic theory and evidence 
provides strong support for concerns about the danger posed by predatory pricing.27 
Although predatory litigation has not been studied as closely as predatory pricing, it 
seems more likely to succeed.28 Predatory litigation has an advantage over predatory 
pricing because the cost to the predator declines after the first lawsuit — the plaintiff can 
                                                                                                                                                 
depends on the difference in litigation costs borne by the defendant compared to the plaintiff. Bone 
explains that most lawsuits do not feature large asymmetries in the costs borne by plaintiffs and defendants. 
See Bone, supra note 12, at 537-41. IP cases often do impose much higher litigation costs on defendants 
than plaintiffs. One source of asymmetry arises from disruption of the defendant’s business caused by 
preliminary injunctions and other factors. See infra x. Another asymmetry arises because some 
opportunistic plaintiffs sue multiple defendants and spread the cost of litigation across those cases. 
23 L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976) 
(“To extend copyrightability to minuscule variations would simply put a weapon for harassment in the 
hands of mischievous copiers intent on appropriating and monopolizing public domain work.”) 
24 For a non-IP example of bad faith litigation deterring entry see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 
410 US 366 (19xx) (power company maintained monopoly by using litigation to prevent rival’s entry). 
25 See Joseph F. Brodley, Patrick Bolton & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and 
Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L. J. 2241, 2300-01 (describing reputation effect predation). Reputational models of 
predation have been developed by: David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect 
Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation and 
Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982); Garth Saloner, Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete 
Information, 18 RAND J. ECON. 165 (1987). 
26 See Matsushita. Even though courts are skeptical of predatory pricing claims there is a high level antitrust 
enforcement directed against it. See Brodley, et al., supra note 26, at x. Courts are also reluctant to impose 
liability for predatory product innovation because they fear they will unduly inhibit innovation. See Myers, 
supra, note 22, at 580-86.  
27 See Brodley, et al., supra note 26, at 2244-2249 (recounting ample empirical and experimental evidence 
of predatory pricing and concluding “present judicial skepticism about predatory pricing assumes that 
predation is extremely rare, but sound empirical and experimental studies, as well as modern economic 
theory, do not justify this assumption.”). 
28 See infra text accompanying notes x. Myers, supra, note 22, at 601 (1992). Predatory litigation is more 
difficult to detect, especially when the lawsuit has some merit. Michael W. Bien, Litigation as an Antitrust 
Violation: Conflict Between the First Amendment and the Sherman Act, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 41 (1981). 
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use the work product from the first litigation in subsequent litigation.29 Predatory pricing 
does not offer a comparable advantage; the predator has to reduce its prices to combat 
every new entrant, and thus incurs a relatively constant cost.30 
B. Opportunistic Suits 
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the problem of opportunistic IP litigation is 
serious and getting worse.31 Defendants fear the high cost of IP litigation,32 and settle 
opportunistic claims to avoid that cost.33 I offer some examples from patent,34 
trademark,35 and copyright law36 with a caveat — it is difficult to know whether a 
particular lawsuit is opportunistic, and so it is more appropriate to present the following 
as possible examples of opportunistic suits. 
 The explosion of e-commerce patents has generated many complaints about 
opportunistic patent litigation.37 An alleged example relates to the company E-Data that 
sent letters to 75,000 companies informing them that they infringe an E-Data patent and 
                                                 
29 See Myers, supra, note 22, at 598.  
30 Predatory pricing might place greater costs on the predator than the prey, because the predator suffers a 
loss across a larger share of the market. Myers, supra note 22, at 597. In contrast, litigation favors the 
plaintiff, because plaintiff gets to choose the forum and the initial direction of the discovery. Id. at 598. 
31 See Brenda Sandburg, Battling the Patent Trolls, The Recorder, July 31, 2001 available at: 
http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article&oldid=ZZZ4DX7MSPC) 
 (In 1999 patent claims against Intel totaled over $15 billion). 
32 See Teresa Riordan, Trying to Cash In on Patents, Jun. 10, 2002, N. Y. TIMES. available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/10/technology/10PATE.html (reporting the average cost of patent 
litigation is $2 million); Sandburg, supra note 32 (same). 
33 See SHULMAN, supra note 22, at 55 (Many defendants acquiesce rather than face the expense of fighting 
an infringement suit.) 
34 Compton’s multimedia patent. 
35 Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L. J. 1687, 1696-
97 (1999) (describing trademark claims based on the registered trademarks "Class of 2000" and the yellow 
smiley-face, and characterizing these claims as "frivolous" under "traditional trademark law") 
36 Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World 4 (2001) (citing 
examples of hold-up of movies by owners of copyrights protecting works incidentally appearing in movie 
sets);  Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1946). 
37 Troy Wolverton, Patent Lawsuit Could Sting eBay, CNET News.com, September 5, 2002, available at: 
http://news.com.com/2100-1017-956638.html (Thomas Woolston, an inventor and patent attorney, has 
been awarded four patents related to online auctions and has 10 others pending, he is suing eBay for 
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asking them to pay royalties between $5,000 and $50,000.38 The company owns a patent 
which arguably covers financial transactions on the Internet.39 Several high profile 
companies took a license but most refused. E-Data sued 41 of the companies for patent 
infringement.40 This case and other notorious e-commerce cases are criticized because the 
inventions appear to be obvious,41 or the claims are not nearly as broad as purported by 
the plaintiffs.42 
 A string of opportunistic trademark suits was brought by a company called S 
Industries.43 “[T]he company filed at least 33 trademark infringement lawsuits in the 
district court between 1995 and 1997.”44 The plaintiff used the mark Sentra with over-
the-counter, discount computer mouse pads.45 In one case it sued a company named 
Centra which used the mark in association with expensive data management software 
bought by petrochemical, aerospace, and other manufacturing industries.46 The Seventh 
Circuit found that the lawsuit lacked merit, was oppressive and “plaintiff's conduct 
unreasonably increased the cost of defending against the suit.”47 
                                                                                                                                                 
infringement. Amazon.com, Priceline.com, Barnes&Noble.com, and Expedia have all been targeted for 
lawsuits.). 




42 See supra note 19; Lemley, supra, note 22, at 1517-19; Lynne McKenna Frazier, Small Candy Maker 
Fights E-commerce Patent ‘Extortion,’ (Nov. 04, 2002) available at: 
http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/4454889.htm (Patent No. 5,576,951 allegedly covers 
“automated sales and services system” and Patent No. 6,239,319 allegedly covers an “automatic business 
and financial transaction-processing system.”) On Nov. 15, 2002 the House Small Business Committee 
cosponsored a conference on IP issues for small business that covered the problem of opportunistic IP 
suits.) Id. 
43 See S Industries, Inc. v. Centra 2000, Inc., 249 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming award of attorneys fees 
to defendant because trademark claims were meritless and because of dilatory tactics). 
44 Id. at 628-29. S Industries “actions here look to be part of a pattern of abusive and improper litigation 
with which the company and Lee Stoller, its sole shareholder, have burdened the courts of this circuit...” Id. 
45 Id. at 627. 
46 Id. at 627. 
47 Id., at 627. “During 4 years of litigation… S Industries failed to produce evidence of a single sale of 
‘Sentra’ brand computer software or hardware.” Id. 
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 Opportunistic copyright suits typically pit a minor author against a later 
successful author.48 The plaintiff claims the defendant copied from his earlier work. 
Some enterprising plaintiffs strengthen the claim of copying by distributing their works to 
potential defendants; then they can claim the defendant had access.49 Opportunistic 
copyright claims are also likely when both the plaintiff and the defendant base their work 
on something in the public domain.50 The chutzpah award in this field goes to Ashleigh 
Brilliant who coined 7500 aphorisms, and mounted more than a hundred successful 
copyright infringement suits.51 
 Opportunistic IP suits impose direct and indirect costs on defendants and society. 
Besides settlement payments52 there are sizable direct legal costs,53 and indirect costs 
borne by potential defendants who work to minimize their exposure to opportunistic 
litigation.54 Firms reduce the risk of copyright and trade secret litigation by returning 
unsolicited documents, by making software in “clean rooms” that minimizes the exposure 
                                                 
48 See e.g., Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984). The court held that the movie E.T. did 
not infringe the derivative rights of the creator of the screenplay “Lokey From Maldomar,” because the 
screenplay was not substantial similar to the movie. See also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 
1946). 
49  
50 L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 489-90 (2d Cir.) 
51 See SHULMAN, supra note 22, at 9. A plaintiff is more likely to succeed by bringing a sequence of 
frivolous suits like those brought by E-Data, S Industries, and Brilliant than by bringing an isolated suit. 
The plaintiff can develop a reputation for imposing costs on defendants even if that also means costs to the 
plaintiff. The reputation for being tough makes the frivolous claim more credible and more valuable. See 
Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 Theory & Decision 127 (1978), and subsequent work by 
economists on reputation. 
52 Transfer payments are usually not a source of social loss. Settlement payments to end frivolous lawsuits 
only cause a social loss to the extent that they distort the decision of firm to enter a market protected by 
intellectual property rights because of the fear of litigation. 
53 Amy Harmon, Suddenly, “Idea Wars” Take on a New Global Urgency, Nov. 11, 2001, N. Y. Times. 
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/11/business/11PROP.html (reporting that patent litigation 
cost American companies $4 billion in the year 2000); Del Jones, Businesses Battle Over Intellectual 
Property: Courts Choked with Lawsuits to Protect Ideas and Profits, USA Today, Aug. 2, 2000, at 1B, 2000 
WL 5785645 (describing the flood of patent litigation). 
54 Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 
241, 273-79  (1998) (noting the high social cost of trade secret litigation). 
12 December 2002 CONTROLLING IP LITIGATION 11
of programmers to copyrighted code, and by documenting independent creation.55 
Opportunistic (and anticompetitive) patent and trade dress cases may deter firms from 
entering new markets or adopting new product features or designs.56 
 There are several reasons the incidence of opportunistic IP litigation is increasing. 
First, intellectual property has become more valuable,57 and the number of patents, 
copyrights and trademarks has increased rapidly.58 The rate of IP litigation has grown 
comparably fast.59 Opportunistic suits are likely to increase as legitimate suits increase 
because it is easier to “hide” an opportunistic lawsuit and bluff your way to a settlement 
payment. Second, a growing market for the sale of IP rights makes it easier to “enter the 
market” for opportunistic IP litigation.60 Finally, in recent years patent plaintiffs have 
                                                 
55 JULIE COHEN, LYDIA LOREN, RUTH OKEDIJI, & MAUREEN O'ROURKE, COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 2002 
chap. 6 p.10 (“In the face of decisions like Ty and Bouchat, establishing procedures to document the 
creative process has become a matter of pressing concern for companies that create and commission 
copyrighted works.”) 
56 See  
57 Kevin G. Rivette & David Kline, Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property, Harv. Bus. Rev. 54, 56 
(Jan.-Feb. 2000) (IBM boosted its patent royalties from $30 million in 1990 to $1 billion in 2000) 
Sandburg, supra note 32 (from 1980 to 1999 royalties on patents in the United States grew from $3 billion 
to nearly $110 billion.) 
58 See Harmon, supra note 54 (reporting that patent applications and copyright registrations are soaring); 
Lemley, supra, note 22, at 1497-1499 (2001); Michael H. Dessent, Digital Handshakes In Cyberspace 
Under E-Sign: "There's A New Sheriff In Town!",  35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 943 (Jan. 2002); J. Thomas 
McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 143 (Nov. 1985). 
59 Brenda Sandburg, A New Industry Transforms the Patent System: Congress, Corporations Eye Reform as 
Power of Patent Enforcers Grows, The Recorder  July 31, 2001 available at http://www.law.com/cgi-
bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FTContentServer?pagename=law/View&c=Article&cid=ZZZP3ISKSPC&live=true
&cst=1&pc=0&pa=0&s=News&ExpIgnore=true&showsummary=0 (“With the growth in patent licensing, 
the number of patent suits has doubled in the past decade, from 1,171 in 1991 to 2,484 in 2000, according 
to data compiled by Paul Janicke, a professor at the University of Houston Law Center.”); Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 611, 
623 n.58 (1999) (accelerating frequency of federal trade dress lawsuits); Lemley, supra note 36, at 1700 
(product configuration cases have grown explosively in the last fifteen years). 
60 Brenda Sandburg, Patent Blockbuster Goes to High Court: IP attorneys looking to U.S. Supreme Court to 
clear up confusion over 'Festo,' The Recorder, June 19, 2001 found at www.law.com/cgi-
bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FTContentServer?pagename=law/View&c=Article&cid=ZZZ9RZXY4OC&live=tru
e&cst=1&pc=3&pa=0&s=News&ExpIgnore=true&showsummary=0 (“Matthew Powers, a partner at Weil, 
Gotshal & Manges' Menlo Park, Calif., office, [said that Festo] eliminates a lot of slop out there. Powers 
said there are companies that buy a patent for $50,000 at a bankruptcy auction and then decide to sue the 
world for it. ’They are counting on the slop factor of the doctrine of equivalents to give them leverage to 
get a big settlement,’ Powers said.”) 
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been effectively organized and financed by entrepreneurs specializing in patent litigation 
and licensing.61 Patent lawsuit investors avoid champerty62 laws by purchasing ownership 
or joint ownership of patents.63 
C. Anti-Competitive Lawsuits 
Firms often use IP litigation to exclude their rivals.64 Occasionally, firms with 
broad patents exclude their rivals from the markets protected by the patents. More 
commonly, firms use IP rights to exclude rivals from use of a product feature, variety, or 
design. Exclusionary litigation can be a socially desirable way to secure a reward to 
innovative firms;65 the term anti-competitive is reserved for lawsuits that seek socially 
undesirable exclusion.66 In an ideal intellectual property system it would be impossible to 
                                                 
61 See Sandburg, supra note 32  (“In the last three to five years, the business has been growing 
exponentially because everybody is getting into the act, said David Braunstein, vice president of the 
intellectual property consulting firm Fairfield Resources International Inc. of Stamford, Conn.”); Investors 
Wanted For Lawsuits, Bus. Wk. 78 (Nov. 15, 1993); Poonam Puri, Financing of Litigation by Third-Party 
Investors: A Share of Justice, 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 515, 541 (1998); Susan Lorde Martin, Financing 
Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and Legal) Business, 53 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 57 (2000). A 
new corporation in Canada has been formed to take advantage of the relaxed standards in place in most 
states. This publicly traded corporation’s sole business is to finance large patent infringement lawsuits in 
the U.S. Id. at 82. Instead of simply providing the financial backing for the infringement lawsuit the 
company buys an interest in the patent and then joins the first patent holder as a plaintiff in the case, 
receiving compensation for whatever reward the lawsuit brings.” Id. As an alternative to an ownership 
stake, patent litigation is done on a contingency basis with percentages as high as 45%. Sandburg, supra 
note 32. 
62 “Champerty is a practice in which one person, the champertor, agrees to support another in bringing a 
legal action, in exchange for part of the proceeds of the litigation. It is a form of maintenance, which is a 
general category that includes any agreement by which one person finances another’s legal action.” Martin, 
supra note 62, at x. Champerty is prohibited throughout the U.S. based on fears that champertor’s will 
bring frivolous litigation, harass defendants, increase damages, and resist settlement. Id. at 58 
63 See Investors Wanted For Lawsuits, BUS. WK. 78 (Nov. 15, 1993);  Intex Plastic Sales Co. v. Hall, 20 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 960 F.2d 155 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding patent 
infringement lawsuit valid after patent holder assigned sixty five percent interest in his patent to WBX 
partners). 
64 For a thorough discussion of anti-competitive litigation see generally Myers, supra, note 22. 
65 Examples of firms being driven from a market by plaintiffs with strong claims are easy to find. See e.g.,  
Rivette & Kline, supra, note 58, at 64-65 (describing how Polaroid won a $925 million patent judgment 
against Kodak and forced Kodak out of the instant photography business); Associated Press, Online Music 
Provider Now Has Second Bidder, N. Y. Times, Nov. 15, 2000; (movie file-sharing service pushed to 
bankruptcy by a copyright lawsuit brought by the MPAA); Matt Richtel, Web Company Will Sell Assets to 
Settle Lawsuit on Music Files, Nov. 2, 2000, N. Y. Times. 
66 Judge Posner in Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. wrote that “litigation could be used for 
improper purposes even when there is probable cause for the litigation; and if the improper purpose is to 
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mount an anti-competitive IP lawsuit, because such suits would not be credible. In reality, 
anti-competitive lawsuits are possible because undeserving claimants receive 
presumptively valid or at least colorable rights to intellectual property. 
Anti-competitive suits achieve an exclusionary outcome through two different 
mechanisms. First, some defendants settle because they fear the scope of the plaintiff’s IP 
right will be construed too broadly, or because the defendant lacks information proving 
the IP right is invalid. Second, other defendants may be confident the plaintiff would lose 
the lawsuit but still settle simply to avoid the costs of litigation. In addition to gaining a 
favorable settlement, the owner of a weak IP right may succeed in deterring competitors 
from using his intellectual property because of the threat of suit.68 
 Successful anti-competitive IP litigation does not leave much of a record, but 
there are many cases of failed exclusion.69 Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon70 gives an example 
of a patent plaintiff that hoped to bluff its way to an anti-competitive settlement 
agreement. Ethicon controlled 90% of the market for heat-sealed plastic gloves.71 It tried 
to preserve its dominant position by suing an entrant for patent infringement. Ethicon 
knew the patent was invalid because there was a previous inventor and because of public 
                                                                                                                                                 
use litigation as a tool for suppressing competition in its antitrust sense, it becomes a matter of antitrust 
concern.” 
68 Grip-Pak, x F.3d at x (“many claims not wholly groundless would never be sued on for their own sake; 
the stakes, discounted by the probability of winning, would be too low to repay the investment in 
litigation.”); see also Myers, supra, note 22, at 602-04. 
69 Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., (N.D. Ga., March 29, 2001) (allegedly baseless patent infringement by Bayer 
to block competition from generic drug). 
70 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984). 
71 Id. at x.  
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use more than one before the patent application.72 Handgards called the bluff and 
discovered evidence of the earlier inventor and the prior use and invalidated the patent. 
 Besides patent litigation, trade dress claims related to product design and 
configuration pose the gravest threat of predation.73 Trade dress is defined to include 
packaging, and product design or configuration. Product design and configuration can be 
protected under trademark law because it is capable of indicating a source of origin, for 
example, the pink color of building insulation indicates that Owens Corning is the 
insulation manufacturer. Trade dress protection must not reach functional features of the 
trade dress, because those features are exclusively protectable under patent law. 
 Ferraris Medical, Inc., v. Azimuth Corp.,74 documents anti-competitive trade 
dress litigation motivated by the desire to impose litigation costs and discourage 
competition.75 Ferraris made a harness used to hold a facemask and other equipment on 
the heads of surgical patients. Azimuth and other companies bought these devices from 
Ferraris and resold them under their own brand names. Azimuth stopped buying its 
supplies from Ferraris and copied Ferraris’s unpatented design. Ferraris responded by 
                                                 
72 Id. at x. 
73 J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act §43(a): The Sleeping Giant is Now Wide Awake, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 45, 46, 64-67 (1996) (potential anticompetitive effects caused by trade dress protection). McCarthy 
cites  cases that upheld preliminary trade dress injunctions relating to subject matter that appears to be 
functional or a business method, id. at 65, and laments “Judicial distaste for competitive imitation appears 
to often turn the scales in a case.” Id. In a recent trade dress infringement lawsuit the trial court observed: 
“It seems reasonably evident that plaintiff's motivation in pursuing these unsupported claims was rooted in 
an effort to deter competition by Azimuth.” Ferraris Medical, Inc., v. Azimuth Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13589 (unpublished opinion) (D.N.H. 2002) *9. 
74 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13589 (unpublished opinion) (D.N.H. 2002) 
75 The trial judge stated the plaintiff’s “goal seemed always to be acquisition of monopolistic control over 
the manufacture and sale of surgical harnesses with the features of those it sold, but it had no legal or 
factual basis to support a design or other patent claim.” Id. at *9-10. 
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suing Azimuth on a frivolous trade dress infringement theory76 and other frivolous 
trademark77 and copyright infringement theories.78  
 Lawsuits like Ferraris are troubling because they can be costly enough to create 
financial distress that could delay entry or force a firm to completely abandon a product 
line already occupied by a dominant incumbent.79 Financial market predation is a serious 
problem for new firms,80 especially firms in high-technology industries.81 Investors with 
limited information often design financial arrangements that are contingent on easily 
observed performance measures — especially cash flow. A predator can sabotage a 
                                                 
76 When awarding attorney’s fees to the defendant, the court observed “the trial evidence revealed (and this 
was not a close or even arguable point) that Ferraris had no legal or factual basis upon which to claim that 
its harness design was either non-functional or had acquired secondary meaning, essential prerequisites to 
claiming unregistered trade dress protection.” Id. at *3-4. 
77 “Ferraris had no legitimate legal or factual basis to assert ‘service mark’ protection in the photographic 
display used by Azimuth, and no basis whatever for claiming that Azimuth somehow appropriated a service 
mark belonging to Ferraris.” Id. at *3. 
78 “Ferraris had no factual or legal basis upon which to claim copyright protection in the photographic 
display or depiction Azimuth used in its catalogue advertisements of its own SunMed harnesses - that 
depiction was plainly and unarguably in the public domain, as Ferraris knew or should well have known.” 
Id. 
79 See id.; Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 111, 113-114 (D. Mass. 2001) 
(The goal of the trade dress suit was “to intimidate, discourage and financially damage an upstart 
competitor.” The plaintiff’s claims were objectively unreasonable and the plaintiff was motivated by “a 
desire to financially damage a competitor by forcing it into costly litigation.” The court emphasized that the 
plaintiff was the industry leader and the defendant was a much smaller competitor, and that the plaintiff 
made no attempt to settle.). For a non-IP example see Alexander v. National Farmers Organization, 687 
F.2d 1173 (xth Cir. 19xx) (two dairy producers engaged in a pattern of abusive litigation against a small 
competitor, defendants considered sponsoring third party litigation in order to increase costs on plaintiff.). 
80 Established firms frequently sue departing employees alleging that the start-up benefited from 
misappropriated trade secrets. “Indeed, the circumstances of trade secret cases and the uncertainty of trade 
secret law create incentives for frivolous litigation designed to harass competitors rather than to obtain 
relief for trade secret misappropriation. For example, a company might sue ex-employees who leave to start 
a competing firm in order to hinder their ability to raise capital during the start-up phase. Frivolous suits of 
this sort not only add to litigation costs, they also chill competition.” Bone, supra note 5, at 279. Start-ups 
are also vulnerable to predatory trademark claims based on the similarity of marketing practices of the 
established firm and the start-up. See PS Promotions, Inc. v. Stern, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3096 (N.D. Ill. 
2001) *2-3 (Plaintiff was required to pay attorney’s fees to defendant who was a former employee. The 
plaintiff brought false advertising and false designation of origin claims based on the defendants use of 
promotional materials he created while working for the plaintiff). 
81 See Dawn Kawamoto, CNET News.com, Lawsuits Dampen VCs’ File Sharing Enthusiasm, Sep. 4, 2000, 
N. Y. Times. ( “The threat of vicarious liability has scared off many venture firms from the file-sharing 
arena.”); Brodley, et al., supra note 26, at 2287 (“[P]redatory pricing may pose a special threat in rapidly 
growing, high-technology industries, which often involve intellectual property and continuing 
innovation.”).  
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prey’s relationship with its investors by causing cash flow problems.82 Investors are not 
well enough informed about the prey’s actions and economic conditions to know whether 
financial problems result from predation, bad management, or some other cause.  
 Predatory litigation reduces cash flow because of the high cost of IP litigation and 
a variety of other indirect costs.83 Litigation can sour a defendant’s credit rating.84 A 
predatory plaintiff can divert customers from a defendant, by threatening the defendant’s 
customers with a lawsuit.85 Furthermore, the plaintiff can use a preliminary injunction to 
block the defendant’s production and sales before trial.86  
 Costly predatory tactics are irrational unless the predator can recoup its litigation 
cost.87 A preliminary injunction and the deterrent effect of even a weak IP right gives a 
valuable lead-time advantage.88 Ultimately, the predator hopes to more than recoup its 
                                                 
82 See id. at 2286; PayPal, CertCo End Patent Spat, ZDNet News, Apr. 29, 2002, available at: 
http://zdnet.com.com/2110-1106-894679.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) (defendant complained that 
patent lawsuit was designed to delay defendant’s IPO, the defendant made a settlement payment but did not 
take a patent license). 
83 See Myers, supra, note 22, at 590-91( “A target firm may be forced to divulge proprietary information, 
such as trade secrets, new product developments, and marketing strategies in the course of discovery. 
While a lawsuit is pending, the target firm may also be forced to disclose its contingent liability to 
creditors, accountants, and others. This revelation would hamper it’s ability to obtain the funds necessary to 
compete.”); Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J. 
L. Econ. 573, 591 (2001)  (smaller firms have higher litigation costs and suffer greater indirect costs caused 
by the dilution of management’s equity ownership); Handgards,  (The antitrust plaintiff claimed that 
“Ethicon had generated adverse publicity regarding its infringement actions, threatening potential 
customers of the plaintiff, with the result that vital corporate resources were committed to defense of the 
infringement actions, Handgards’ relations with potential customers were impaired, a proposed joint 
venture was aborted, and the company found itself unable to obtain outside financing necessary for it to 
remain competitive in the industry.”) 
84 See Myers, supra, note 22, at 590-91. Creditors are generally unwilling to extend credit while litigation is 
in process or without a legal opinion as to the merits of the claim. Id. 
85 See id. at 600. 
86 See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 84, at 574 (preliminary injunctions induce patent infringement 
defendants to settle). See infra Part III.A. 
87 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
88 See Arti K. Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 199, 212 (2000). 
91 The belief that deep pockets give a predator an advantage was emphasized by Telser. See Lester G. 
Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J. L. & ECON. 259 (1966). Critics argued that a viable 
competitor would never succumb to predation because financial markets are so efficient. Cites. More recent 
theory offers a variety of reasons why prey cannot obtain access to capital markets on the same terms as the 
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cost of litigation by reducing competition and raising prices. This is most likely when the 
plaintiff has greater financial resources than the defendant.91  
There are countermeasures that help some small firms ward off IP litigation by 
large rivals. A small chip design company averted a patent infringement lawsuit from 
Intel by purchasing a patent from a bankrupt firm that potentially covered Intel chips.93 
Another microelectronics firm was rescued from financial distress (caused by a patent 
infringement suit) through a friendly takeover by a white knight.94 Generally, such 
countermeasures are not available because transaction costs, private information and free-
rider problems discourage the formation of coalitions that might battle the predator.95 
II. PRE-TRIAL CONTROL OF SOCIALLY HARMFUL IP LITIGATION  
A. Preliminary Injunctions 
 Despite the restrictive standard for granting preliminary injunctions96 they are 
common in patent and copyright cases.97 To get a preliminary injunction a plaintiff must 
                                                                                                                                                 
predator, and why financial distress may be an effective weapon. Brodley, et al., supra note 26, at 2285-
2290.  
93 See Kevin G. Rivette & David Kline, supra note 58, at 62. 
94 Id. at 63. 
95 Brodley, et al., supra note 26, at 2322-23. Reorganization in bankruptcy or transfer of the prey’s assets to 
another firm are not likely to be successful countermeasures to predation. Id. at 2289-90. The possibility 
that a successor firm will acquire the prey’s assets does not deter predatory pricing because: (1) in some 
cases the prey’s assets are too small to achieve efficient operating scale; (2) the successor will lag far 
behind in gaining market share in a network industry; (3) fungible assets will sell at the market price not a 
discount; (4) customers may be shy to leave the predator; (5) the predator may obtain the prey’s assets; and 
(6) successor firms are apt to fear the predator. Id. at 2326-27. 
96 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, 9 FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE 129 §2948 (1995) (“It is frequently observed that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 
remedy,…”). 
97 See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 554 (2000) (preliminary injunctions are routine in copyright cases if the plaintiff can 
show likelihood of infringement); Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 84, at x (preliminary injunctions are 
common in patent cases). 
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show: (1) reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the irreparable harm if 
preliminary relief is not granted; (3) the balance of hardships favors the plaintiff; and (4) 
granting the injunction would not disserve the public interest.98 Preliminary injunctions 
are common in patent and copyright cases because the courts find irreparable injury quite 
easily and are reluctant to invoke the public interest in avoiding opportunistic and anti-
competitive suits.99 
 Preliminary injunctions promote opportunistic and anti-competitive suits by 
disrupting the defendant’s business, by raising the total cost of litigation, and causing 
financial distress.100 Empirical evidence shows that preliminary injunctions tend to be 
used in patent cases mostly by large firms that seek to impose a financial burden on 
smaller rivals.101 The financial burden caused by a preliminary injunction is exacerbated 
by the “particular difficulty of raising external funds to finance litigation.”102 Therefore, 
preliminary injunctions may be especially harmful in innovative industries “driven by 
smaller, more vulnerable, venture-capital-based firms ….”103 
                                                 
98 New England Braiding Co., Inc. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed.Cir.1992); Am. Red 
Cross v. Palm Beach Blood Bank, Inc., 143 F.3d 1407, 1410 (11th Cir.1998). “The chief function of a 
preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the controversy can be fully and 
fairly adjudicated.” Northeastern Fl. Chapter of Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 
Fl., 896 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir.1990). 
99 See H.H. Robertson Co. v. U.S. Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (presumption of irreparable 
harm in patent cases); Polaroid v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481 (D.Mass. 1990) (unwilling to 
consider plant closings and job loss as a public interest consideration in the context of a preliminary 
injunction); MERGES, ET AL., supra note 98, at 554 (irreparable harm found easily in copyright cases). 
100 Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 84, at 573-74 (reporting anecdotal evidence that firms seek preliminary 
injunctions in patent cases “to impose financial stress on their rivals.”) 
101 See id. at 575-76, 595 (2001) (reporting empirical evidence that the financial strength of the plaintiff is 
significantly correlated with the use of preliminary injunctions in patent cases)  
102 Id. at 574. 
103 Id. at 575. 
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 The harm from opportunistic and anti-competitive IP litigation can be alleviated 
by reducing the availability of preliminary injunctions.104 Ideally, judges would deny 
preliminary injunctions to plaintiffs with weak lawsuits because, by definition, such suits 
are not likely to succeed, but the facts that make weak lawsuits credible also create 
problems for judges. At an early stage of litigation the judge, like the defendant, may 
have difficulty assessing the scope and validity of the IP right. A desirable reform would 
eliminate the presumption of patent validity in the context of a preliminary injunction, 
thereby increasing the burden on a plaintiff to show a likelihood of success.105 Some 
judges have shown sensitivity to the problems created by preliminary injunctions, and the 
law gives trial judges enough flexibility to accommodate a significant shift in practice.106 
Judges should attend more closely to the financial distress imposed on defendants and 
show a greater inclination to refuse preliminary injunctions in cases in which the balance 
                                                 
104 See Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002) (district court judge did 
not abuse discretion by refusing to grant a preliminary injunction considering low probability of success by 
plaintiff and hardship to defendant); Amazon v. Barnes & Noble, x F.3d x (Fed. Cir. 200x) (no preliminary 
injunction because of law probability of patent validity).  
 Judges can also exert some control over preliminary injunctions by requiring bonds from 
plaintiffs, and choosing appropriately narrow terms for the injunction. Rule 65(c) gives a district court 
judge discretion to determine what bond a plaintiff should post in support of a preliminary injunction. 
F.R.C.P. 65(c). Bonds have not always effective as a measure for controlling socially harmful litigation 
because the bonds are usually small or nominal if the plaintiff is small or capital-constrained. See Erin 
Connors Morton, Security for Interlocutory Injunctions under Rule 65(c): Exceptions to the Rule Gone 
Awry, 46 Hastings L. J. 1863 (1995).  
 Defendants have some measure of control through suits based on malicious prosecution against 
plaintiffs who obtain preliminary injunctions in bad faith. See WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 97, at 463-64 
§2973.  
105 See Canon Computer Sys., Inc. v. Nu-Kote Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 1085, 1088 (Fed.Cir.1998) (Patents are 
entitled to a presumption of validity at the preliminary injunction stage.) The Federal Circuit made 
preliminary injunctions easier to obtain. Regional circuit courts used to require a showing of validity and 
infringement “beyond question.” The Federal Circuit now requires a likelihood of validity and infringement 
for a preliminary injunction. See John G. Mills & Louis S. Zarfas, The Developing Standard for 
Irreparable Harm in Preliminary Injunctions to Prevent Patent Infringement, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC'Y 51, 55-56 (1999).  
106 Rule 65(a) gives judges discretion over whether to grant a preliminary injunction. See Vault v. Quaid 
Software Ltd., 655 F.Supp. 750, 757 aff’d 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin 
Co. (noting courts are free to deny both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in copyright cases to 
serve the public interest). If the balance of harm to the plaintiff and defendant is about equal then a 
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of hardships favors the defendants.107 Furthermore, judges should discourage 
opportunistic suits by denying preliminary injunctions to plaintiffs who are not likely to 
enter the defendant’s market.108 Denial is appropriate because irreparable harm is 
unlikely.109  
B. Declaratory Judgment 
 Declaratory judgments are relatively difficult to get because courts will not issue 
advisory opinions. To establish an actual controversy that warrants a declaratory 
judgment a party must show that it has taken actions in preparation for possible infringing 
conduct, and the IP owner has threatened the party with an infringement suit.110 The 
threat must create a reasonable apprehension of an infringement suit.111 Judges exercise 
substantial discretion regarding whether they will accept a declaratory judgment suit;112 
                                                                                                                                                 
trademark plaintiff must make a strong showing of likelihood of success to get a preliminary injunction. 
Microstrategy, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 340 (4th Cir. 2001). 
107 See Jaeger v. Amer. Int’l Pictures, Inc., 330 F.Supp. 274 (x.D. N.Y. 1971) (copyright suit); cf. Virginia 
Carolina Tools, Inc. v. Int’l Tool Supply, Inc., 984 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1993) (denial of preliminary 
injunction that might drive defendant to bankruptcy in lawsuit involving sale of business).  
108 “[Intel] is pushing for federal legislation that would prohibit companies from winning an injunction 
unless they are actively pursuing the patented technology or could fill a void if the defendant's product were 
pulled off the market.” Sandburg, supra note 60.  
109 See High Tech Medical Instrumentation, Inc.  v. New Image Industr., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 
1995); c.f. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Philips Petroleum Co., 835 F.2d 277, 278 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(stayed a permanent injunction pending appeal because the patent owner was planning to exit the market 
and licensed all comers). The risk that a financially weak defendant is unable to pay damages can be 
reduced by requiring the defendant to post a bond. A similar practice is used when permanent injunctions 
are stayed on appeal. See Reuters, Palm Ordered to Pay Bond in Patent Suit, CNET News.com, Feb. 25, 
2002, available at: http://news.com.com/2100-1040-844863.html (district court judge declined to enjoin 
Palm from selling infringing PDAs because the plaintiff Xerox would not suffer irreparable harm, but 
required Palm to post a bond to cover damages in case their appeal failed). Of course, the bond itself could 
impose a burden on the defendant. 
110 See Sherwood Med. Indus., Inc. v. Deknatel, Inc., 512 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1975); Diagnostic Unit 
Inmate Council v. Films Inc., 88 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1996); Bryan Ashley Int'l, Inc. v. Shelby Williams 
Indus., 932 F.Supp. 290 (S.D. Fla. 1996). See WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 97, at 597 §2761 (1998) (same 
principles apply to patent, trademark, and copyright declaratory judgment suits). 
111 See Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
112 See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 115 S.Ct. 2137, 2143 (1995) (stating district courts have a “unique 
breadth of … discretion to decline to enter a declaratory judgment.”); EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 
807 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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that discretion is reflected in the variable and fact intensive treatment of the reasonable 
apprehension requirement.113  
 Declaratory judgments of noninfringement or invalidity help mitigate the harm 
from opportunistic and anti-competitive IP litigation.114 If an IP owner threatens a 
supplier or its customers, then the supplier can respond quickly by filing a declaratory 
judgment suit instead of waiting to respond to an infringement suit that could be 
strategically delayed.115 Appropriately, the IP owner’s litigiousness is a factor favoring 
the apprehension of lawsuit and standing to file a declaratory judgment.116 Declaratory 
judgment also helps potential defendants to organize and share the cost of challenging the 
validity of a patent.117 Opportunistic patent plaintiffs may threaten weaker defendants 
                                                 
113 See KIMBERLY PACE MOORE, PAUL R. MICHEL, & RAPHAEL V. LUPO, PATENT LITIGATION AND 
STRATEGY 29 (1999).  
114 Declaratory judgment suits are a useful tactic for blunting the threat of anticompetitive litigation by an 
exclusive patent licensee. The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) holds patents on different 
types of human stem cells. WARF gave an exclusive license to Geron covering a subset of the patented 
stem cells. WARF sued Geron seeking a declaratory judgment that Geron failed to exercise its option under 
its exclusive license to include additional cell types within the license. WARF fears that Geron will 
interfere with future licenses between WARF and third parties. See Pharmaceutical Law & Policy, 
University Affiliate Sues Biotech Firm Over Licensing of New Stem Cell Types, Vol. 1 Num. 7 (Aug. 23, 
2001); UVentures.com, US Patent 6.200.806 Could be Gatekeeper to Further Stem Cell Research, (Nov. 2, 
2001) available at http://www.uventures.com/servlets/UVTechNews/3071 (last visited Aug. x, 2002); Tim 
Adams, Stem Cell lawsuit Heats Up, Biotechnology Newswatch 5 (Oct. 1, 2001), available at: 2001 WL 
8787971. 
115 See WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 97, at 575 §2761 (1998); Windmoller v. Laguerre, 284 F.Supp. 563, 565 
(D.D.C. 1968) (declaratory judgment serves “the public’s interest in certainty and prompt decision, 
particularly where potential competition may well be suppressed unnecessarily through the use of 
questionable patents…”). Delay by the IP owner is limited by the laches doctrine. 
116 West Interactive Corp. v. First Data Resources, Inc., 972 F.2d 1295, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
117 It is difficult to overcome collective action problems and organize private parties to share the cost of 
invalidating a patent, but it does happen. See National Hairdressers’ & Cosmetologists’ Ass’n v. Philad 
Co., 3. F.R.D. 199 (D. Del. 1943) (association sued for declaratory judgment of patent invalidity after 
patent owner sued or threatened to sue many of the association’s members); Brenda Sandburg, Netscape, 
Microsoft Team Up in Internet Suit, Apr. 2, 2002, LAW.COM available at: http://www.law.com/cgi-
bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FTConentServer … (Microsoft and Netscape are working together to get a 
declaratory judgment of patent invalidity against a patent owner who contends his patents cover accessing 
information over the Internet); John Markoff, Patent Claim Strikes an Electronics Nerve, N.Y.Times, July 
29, 2002, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/29/technology/29JPEG.html?ex=1028942133&ei=1&en=e048194dd745
2ee2 (last visited July 29, 2002) (Members of the Joint Photographic Experts Group (creators of the JPEG 
standard for video compression) said they would were assembling information that would invalidate a 
patent that covers aspects of JPEG.); SHULMAN, supra note 22, at 55-57 (consortium of medical groups has 
12 December 2002 CONTROLLING IP LITIGATION 22
first in order to get quick licenses that create the impression that they have a strong 
case.118 Finally, declaratory judgment gives an alleged infringer some leeway to choose 
the forum.119 Forum choice may reduce the credibility of weak lawsuit, because empirical 
evidence shows that the choice of forum has a significant impact on trial outcome.120 
C. Summary Judgment for the Defendant 
 The law of summary judgment and substantive IP law interact in ways that can 
promote or discourage socially harmful IP litigation.121 Summary judgment for the 
defendant is difficult to achieve when the substantive law sets standards for IP protection 
that are easy for a plaintiff to meet, or standards that call for careful balancing of context 
sensitive criteria. For example, the standard for trademark infringement asks whether the 
defendant’s behavior creates a likelihood of confusion in the minds of consumers. Courts 
have identified as many as nine factors that must be evaluated to determine confusion.122 
With so many factors that must be balanced, it is easy for a plaintiff to present a case that 
gets past summary judgment.123 A further difficulty is that summary judgment on a fact 
intensive question may be delayed until time-consuming and expensive discovery is 
completed. Avoidance of socially harmful litigation requires quick and cheap summary 
                                                                                                                                                 
offered to share the costs of the litigation with Kaiser-Permanente as Kaiser attempts to invalidate a gene 
patent); Frazier, supra note 43 (A small Web-based merchant has organized similar merchants to fight a 
patent lawsuit he sees as an “extortion scam.” He set up a web site for defendants - 
www.youmaybenext.com — to organize the fight against the patent owner.) 
118 Acceptance of licenses is a secondary consideration pointing toward nonobviousness and validity of a 
patent. 
119 The choice of forum is fairly restricted by venue considerations, and so there might not be a venue 
offering the option of a relatively speedy trial. 
120 Choice of forum might also allow the alleged infringer to get an early trial date.  
121 See generally, Bone, supra note 12, at 520-22 (describing summary judgment and other procedural 
reforms motivated by worries about frivolous suits); Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second 
Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 Yale L.J. 73 (1990). 
122 AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (1x); Pignons S. A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid 
Corp., 498 F. Supp. 805, 810 (1980). 
123 See Bone, supra note 12, at 567 (“[P]laintiffs are often able to put off summary judgment by filing 
affidavits attesting to the need for discovery.”) 
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judgment. Therefore, a fact-intensive standard for IP protection or infringement is a poor 
candidate for summary judgment.124  
 Recently, courts have shown greater sensitivity to the desirability of giving 
defendants a chance to extricate themselves from opportunistic or anti-competitive 
litigation through summary judgment.125 The Supreme Court took an important step to 
mitigate harm caused by trade dress infringement suits in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Samara Brothers, Inc.126 The plaintiff Samara claimed trademark protection based on 
their design of a line of children’s clothing. Trade dress (or any other mark) must be 
distinctive to qualify for trademark protection. A plaintiff can show that a word or 
product packaging is either inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness through 
usage — or secondary meaning in trademark jargon.127 The Supreme Court rejected 
Samara’s argument that its clothing was inherently distinctive.128 The Court insisted that 
a putative owner of a trademark in the design or configuration of a product show that the 
trade dress has acquired secondary meaning. The Court explained the requirement of 
secondary meaning with the observation: “Competition is deterred, however, not merely 
by successful lawsuit but by the plausible threat of successful suit, and given the 
                                                 
124 See WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 97, at 143 §2732.1 (1998); Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 
Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that “only in an extreme case can what is a ‘reasonable’ 
precaution be determined on a motion for summary judgment, because the answer depends on a balancing 
of costs and benefits that will vary from case to case....”). 
125 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US 317, 323-24 (1986) (“One of the principal purposes of the 
summary judgment rule … is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we 
think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose.”); Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 586 (1986); Bone, supra note 12, at 593-96 (judicial 
screening based on early summary judgment combined with targeted discovery is the best method of 
controlling frivolous litigation). 
126 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
127 A trademark owner must show that a product design has been used in such a way that the public comes 
to recognize the design as an indicator of origin. Walmart. Secondary meaning can be proven with 
consumer surveys or by showing significant advertising and sales. Cite. 
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unlikelihood of inherently source-identifying design, the game of allowing lawsuit based 
upon alleged inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle.”129 
 Recent cases demonstrate the impact of Walmart on summary judgment for 
defendants in trade dress infringement cases. In Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater 
Candle Co.,130 the defendant won on summary judgment despite copying131 elements of 
the plaintiff’s design because the plaintiff made no showing of secondary meaning.132 
The plaintiff Yankee claimed trade dress protection in a combination of candle shapes 
and sizes, labels, display method, catalog layout, and quantities of candles sold as a 
unit.133 The First Circuit placed this trade dress in the product design/configuration 
category and not the packaging category, thus Walmart applied and secondary meaning 
was required.134  
 Yankee also claimed infringement of copyright on the labels of nine scented 
candles.135 The court granted summary judgment for the defendant after applying the 
merger doctrine because no reasonable juror could find substantial similarity.136 The 
Yankee Candle decision is representative of the greater receptiveness courts now show to 
                                                                                                                                                 
128 The Supreme Court considered a more fact-intensive standard of distinctiveness and rejected it because: 
“Such a test would rarely provide the basis for summary disposition of an anti-competitive strike suit.” The 
Court also placed the burden on the plaintiff of showing that the trade dress is not functional. 
129 Walmart. 
130 259 F.3d 25, (1st Cir. 2001). 
131 After Walmart, intentional copying plays a minor role is establishing secondary meaning in 
design/configuration cases. Id. at 44-45  
132 Id. at 43-45. Similarly, the Kohler Co. was sued for trade dress infringement because it copied the 
unpatented design of a faucet. I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 118 F. Supp.2d 92 (D.Mass. 2000). 
Kohler won a motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff made no showing of secondary meaning 
in the faucet design. Id. at x. 
133 Id. at 39-40. 
134 Id. at 40 (following Walmart, the First Circuit resolves uncertainty by placing trade dress in the 
design/configuration category) 
135 Id. at 32. 
136 Id. at 32-33. 
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summary judgment in favor of defendants in copyright cases.137  Stricter application of 
the requirement of originality and more careful filtration of unprotectable subject matter 
have modestly increased the burden on copyright plaintiffs, and made summary judgment 
for defendants more likely, nevertheless, defendants still have a hard time getting a 
summary victory because plaintiffs can easily make a prima facie case of copying. 
 Infringement of the reproduction right requires proof of copying — as opposed to 
independent creation. Copying can be proved directly but is usually proved using 
circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial proof of copying requires a showing of access 
and similarity. The Second Circuit in Arnstein v. Porter138 set up a sliding scale. If there 
is no similarity, then access is irrelevant. If there is no access shown, then the similarity 
must be so striking to preclude the possibility of independent creation.139 If there is 
evidence of access and similarity, then the trier of fact decides whether copying occurred. 
When the court must balance factors like access and similarity it is hard for a defendant 
to win summary judgment even though she knows she created the work independently.140 
 In Arnstein v. Porter the plaintiff Arnstein claimed that various musical 
compositions were copied by the defendant Cole Porter. One song sold over a million 
copies, but the second sold only about 2000 copies, and the third was not published but 
had been performed over the radio. The plaintiff also claimed that someone stole a copy 
of the compositions from his room. The trial court decided for the defendant on summary 
judgment. The Second Circuit reversed. The court found enough similarity and access to 
                                                 
137 See COHEN, ET AL., supra note 56, at 51-52 (“... summary judgment in copyright cases has traditionally 
been discouraged. Nevertheless, courts are more frequently employing it as a means to weed out claims that 
lack merit.”) 
138 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied 330 U.S. 851 (1947) (refusing to grant summary judgment for 
a defendant even though the evidence of access and similarity were both weak). 
139 In contrast Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984) (despite striking similarities the appeals court 
affirmed the j.n.o.v. for the defendant because the plaintiff did not make a threshold showing of access). 
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raise a factual question. The court emphasized that issues of credibility created by the 
plaintiff’s allegations must be evaluated by the jury.141  
 Defendants cannot be certain to escape trial and ultimate liability even when they 
have documented their independent creation. Proof of widespread dissemination coupled 
with a theory of subconconscious copying is enough to win a music copyright 
infringement claim.142 Defendants are vulnerable to copyright infringement suits even 
though their connection to the plaintiff is tenuous and their access to the plaintiff’s work 
is entirely conjectural.143 
 Defendants have had some success winning summary judgment in cases involving 
art reproductions. These are cases in which the plaintiff makes a derivative work, and the 
defendant makes a similar work based either on the plaintiff’s work, or based on the 
original that inspired the plaintiff. Rather than pressing the argument for independent 
creation, defendants have succeeded at summary judgment by arguing the plaintiff’s 
work is not copyrightable because it lacks originality. For example, in L. Batlin & Son v. 
Snyder,144 the plaintiff made a plastic Uncle Sam bank based on a cast iron bank in the 
public domain. The plaintiff used the metal bank as a model and made a sketch and a clay 
model. The plastic version had small differences from the original.145 Since the 
                                                                                                                                                 
140 See supra note 119. 
141 The court also noted that a jury could possibly also find an unlawful appropriation because the 
similarities between the compositions were not merely trifling. The dissent approved of summary judgment 
because the works lacked appreciable similarity. The only similarity was small detached and insignificant 
portions. 
142 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Michael Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, x U.S. x (2001) 
(); x (George Harrison was found to have subconsciously copied “He’s so Fine” in “My Sweet Lord”). 
143 Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997) (access and copying may be inferred 
when two works resemble each other and nothing in the public domain); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens, 
Inc., 241 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2000) (submission of a logo to the Ravens organization was enough to establish 
access and support an infringement verdict). 
144 536 F.2d 486 (2nd Cir. en banc 1976). 
145 Many of the differences were not perceptible to the casual observer, and the work took less than two 
days. A smaller base and was 2 inches shorter, the umbrella was pressed against his leg (to allow a one-
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differences were dictated by functional considerations or did not amount to significant 
alterations the originality requirement was not satisfied.146 
 In the field of patent law, the Federal Circuit has pushed two doctrinal positions 
that make summary judgment easier for defendants. First, the court characterized patent 
claim construction as a question of law, and encouraged pre-trial hearings called 
Markman hearings to construe the scope of patent claims.147 Defendants have an 
opportunity to win a summary judgment of noninfringement if they succeed in 
persuading the court to adopt a narrow claim construction.148 Second, the court has 
reduced the role of the doctrine of equivalents.149 Even though it has an equitable origin, 
the doctrine of equivalents allows a fact-finder to expand the literal scope of a patent 
claim to encompass accused processes and devices that depart from the claimed invention 
by making small changes from the claimed invention. In Festo, the Federal Circuit 
fashioned an absolute bar against use of the doctrine of equivalents to expand claim 
limitations that were the subject of narrowing amendments during prosecution history.  
That decision pleased big patent owners like IBM who filed an amicus brief asking the 
Supreme Court to uphold the Federal Circuit decision. The industry amici believed that 
restricting the scope of the doctrine of equivalents would help control opportunistic 
                                                                                                                                                 
piece mold for easier manufacturing), the eagle clutches leaves instead of arrows, the shape and texture of 
the hat, and the shape of the carpet bag was changed. 
146 A similar outcome is found in Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 
F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1021 (1998) (affirming the grant of summary judgment 
for the defendant on the grounds that an inflatable Toucan Sam costume derived from a copyrighted image 
was not copyrightable because it did not have sufficient originality); Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (“Concentrating the right to make derivative works in the owner of the original work prevents 
what might otherwise be an endless series of infringement suits posing insoluble difficulties of proof…”). 
147 See MOORE, ET AL., supra note 114, at 192 (some courts resolve patent claim construction on a summary 
judgment motion near the end of discovery). 
148   
149 The all-element rule allows a defendant to obtain summary judgment on patent infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalence if one of the claimed elements is missing from the alleged infringing device. See 
Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem., 117 S.Ct. 1040 (1997). 
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patent suits. The Supreme Court rejected the absolute bar, but certainly expressed 
sympathy for the Federal Circuit’s goal of increasing the clarity of the property rights 
defined by patent claims. 
III. POST-TRIAL CONTROL OF SOCIALLY HARMFUL IP LITIGATION 
A. Fee Shifting and Attorney Sanctions 
 The copyright, trademark, and patent statutes all have provisions that authorize 
fee shifting151 which allows judges to punish plaintiffs for conducting opportunistic or 
anti-competitive litigation.152 The Lanham Act provides “in exceptional cases” a district 
“court may award reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party.”153 Similarly, the 
Patent Act allows fee shifting in exceptional cases. “Among types of conduct which can 
form a basis for finding a patent infringement case exceptional for attorney fee purposes 
are willful infringement, inequitable conduct before Patent and Trademark Office, 
misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, and frivolous suit.”154 
The copyright standard is more flexible, a district “court in its discretion may allow the 
recovery of full costs by or against any party…. The court may also award a reasonable 
attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.”155 Fee shifting usually benefits 
                                                 
151  
152 See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 943, 953 (1992) 
(reporting survey showing Rule 11 sanctions most often arise because of allegedly frivolous suits). For 
applications to patent cases see Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Companies, Inc., 275 F.3d 1066 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002); Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 269 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
153 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Awarding attorney’s fees in trademark cases is governed by the Lanham Act. 
“Section 35(a) of the Lanham Act, which lists the remedies available for trademark violations, provides in 
pertinent part that ‘[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 
party.’” Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacomm, Inc., 224 F.3d 273 (3rd Cir. 2000) citing 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1117(a). 
154 Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1989) citing 35 U.S.C.A. § 
285. See S Industries, Inc. v. Centra 2000, Inc., 249 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming award of attorneys 
fees to defendant because trademark claims were meritless and because of dilatory tactics). 
155 17 U.S.C. § 505. “Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants must be treated alike for purposes of 
awarding attorney fees under Copyright Act, with attorney fees awarded to prevailing parties only as a 
matter of the court's discretion; Copyright Act attorney fee provision gives no hint that successful plaintiffs 
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plaintiffs in IP cases, especially when defendants are willful infringers, but defendants 
also win fees from a plaintiff.156 A defendant can win a fee shifting award in a copyright 
case when a plaintiff brings “a weak, if nonfrivolous, case and … argue[s] for an 
unreasonable extension of copyright protection…”157 The goal of fee shifting is both 
compensation and deterrence of opportunistic and anti-competitive suits.158 
 Fee shifting deters opportunistic suits by raising the expected cost of weak 
lawsuits and undermining the credibility of the plaintiff’s threat to go to trial.159 One type 
of opportunistic lawsuit is credible because the plaintiff fails to investigate. Sensibly, 
failure to investigate triggers fee shifting and attorney sanctions, thus deterrence is likely 
to be effective.160 A second type of opportunistic lawsuit is credible because of the risk of 
                                                                                                                                                 
are to be treated differently than successful defendants.” Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) 
citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 505. 
156 See Lemley, supra, note 22, at 1530 (difficult for a patent defendant to win attorney's fees); PS 
Promotions, Inc. v. Stern, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3096 (N.D. Ill. 2001) *1-2 (denying attorneys’ fees to 
defendant under the Lanham Act but allowing an award under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which authorizes such an 
award against an attorney who “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.”)  
157 Matthews v. Freedman, 157 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 526-27, and 
Edwards v. Red Farm Studio Co., 109 F.3d 80, 82-83 (1st Cir. 1997)). Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553 
(9th Cir. 1996) (an award of attorney's fees to a copyright defendant is permissible even if the plaintiff 
brought the lawsuit in good faith; the award is justified if the defendant furthers the purpose of the 
Copyright Act); Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (reversing practice that limited the award of 
attorney's fees to cases in which the plaintiff's lawsuit was frivolous or brought in bad faith). 
158 “Nonexclusive factors court is to consider in determining whether to award prevailing party attorney 
fees under Copyright Act include frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in factual 
and in legal components of case) and need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of 
compensation and deterrence.” Matthews?  
159 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis, 82 
Geo. L.J. 397, 404-06 (1993); Lucian Arey Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An analysis of Fee Shifting 
Based on Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. Legal 
Stud. 371 (1996) (Rule 11 could be used to implement a scheme in which attorney’s fees would be 
rewarded when the margin of victory is sufficiently large). But see Meurer, supra note 20, at 87-89 
(showing neither the British rule is not guaranteed to achieve a lower probability of patent litigation than 
the American rule). Two drawbacks to fee shifting are the risk of error and the cost of satellite litigation 
over fees. See Bone, supra note 12, at 589-90. 
160See  Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., x F.3d x (Fed. Cir. 2001) (plaintiff required to pay 
the attorneys fees to defendant in a patent infringement action because plaintiff’s attorneys failed to 
investigate after receiving notice of on sale bar); Ferraris Medical, Inc., v. Azimuth Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13589 **7 (unpublished opinion) (D.N.H. 2002)(trade dress infringement plaintiff was forced to 
pay the defendant’s attorney’s fees because of failure to investigate). 
12 December 2002 CONTROLLING IP LITIGATION 30
judicial error.161 Assuming even the most error prone courts get the decision right most of 
the time, then fee shifting raises expected legal costs to an opportunistic plaintiff, and 
makes an opportunistic lawsuit less credible.162  
 Fee shifting is probably less effective controlling anti-competitive litigation. The 
most aggressive predatory litigation strives to choke off financial resources from the 
defendant.163 The prospect of recovering attorney’s fees after trial has no value to a 
defendant who goes bankrupt before trial, and perhaps little value to a defendant who 
suffers financial distress because of trial cost and delay. It could be a more effective 
deterrent to anti-competitive litigation that attempts to discourage a defendant from 
making a certain product variety. The possibility of recovering attorney’s fees would 
encourage some marginal defendants to fight the predator, and reduce the credibility of 
predatory litigation.164 
B. Sham Litigation and Antitrust Law 
Antitrust law provides a potentially potent means of controlling socially harmful 
IP litigation.165 Certain anti-competitive litigation violates Section Two of the Sherman 
                                                 
161  
162 In the third type of opportunistic suit, plaintiffs with weak claims pretend to have strong claims, and 
defendants cannot distinguish strong from weak claims without extensive discovery or perhaps trial. The 
credibility of these types of suits is sometimes weakened by fee shifting and sometimes unaffected 
depending on the circumstances. See Meurer, supra note 20; Eric Tally, Liability Based Fee-Shifting Rules 
and Settlement Mechanisms Under Incomplete Information, (British rule would not reduce litigation). 
163  Nevertheless, a defendant that withstands predatory litigation should certainly be entitled to fee-
shifting. See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacomm, Inc., 224 F.3d 273 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
(“Defendant's vexatious litigation tactics, consisting of deliberate effort to "bury" plaintiff financially and 
"take everything he had," rendered case sufficiently exceptional to support award of attorney fees to 
prevailing plaintiff in trademark infringement suit, even if infringement was not willful and court could 
have chosen other avenues to sanction improper litigation behavior.”)  
164 See Ferraris Medical, Inc., v. Azimuth Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13589 (unpublished opinion) 
(D.N.H. 2002)  (frivolous copyright and trade dress infringement claims); Yankee Candle Co. v. 
Bridgewater Candle Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 111, 119 (D. Mass. 2001) (In a copyright and trade dress 
infringement case the $1 million fee “award should also serve to deter Yankee Candle and other market 
leaders from bringing overly aggressive and meritless suits against their smaller competitors.”) 
165 For a helpful overview see Myers, supra, note 22. 
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Act166 under two related theories.167 One theory originated in Walker Process Equip. Inc. 
v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp168 and applies only to patent infringement suits. The 
antitrust claimant must show the patentee got its patent by committing common law fraud 
on the Patent Office, and the patent would not have issued but for the fraud.169 The other 
theory applies to sham litigation, including sham IP litigation,170 and is based on a 
showing that the antitrust defendant (IP plaintiff) knew that objectively there was no 
basis for the infringement claim.171  Under either theory, the antitrust plaintiff must prove 
it suffered an antitrust injury, and must also show that the IP litigation created or 
sustained a monopoly in the relevant market.172 
 Trebled antitrust damages are a potent deterrent of anti-competitive activity, but 
in practice, antitrust does little to control socially harmful IP litigation because its reach is 
very limited; it does not apply to opportunistic litigation and applies to only a subset of 
anti-competitive litigation. Antitrust law does not reach opportunistic litigation because 
                                                 
166 The Section 2 requirements for monopolization are “possession of monopoly in the relevant market and 
the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” Source? 
167 If “the litigation involves concerted exclusionary behavior by two or more competitors, it may violate 
Section 1 of the Sherman act as well.” See Myers supra note 22, at x. Predatory litigation can also violate 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for being unfair trade practice. Id. at 578. 
168 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
169 Id. at x. The nature of this fraud is not clear. Compare Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 141 
F.3d 1059, 1071 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 876 (1998) (conduct that gives rise to Walker Process 
fraud is more serious than conduct that give rise to inequitable conduct liability); to Mark D. Janis, 
Transitions in IP and Antitrust, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 253, 274 (2002) (questioning whether the distinction 
between fraud on the Patent Office and inequitable conduct in Nobelpharma will have a significant impact). 
170 Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984). Sham litigation antitrust suits have been 
filed against the party claiming infringement in patent cases, Brunswick v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 
261 (7th Cir. 1984), a copyright case, Prime Time 24 Joint Venture v. NBC, Inc., 21 F.Supp.2d 350, 359 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), trademark cases, Letica Corp. v. Sweethear Cup Co., 790 F.Supp. 702 (E.D.Mich. 1992); 
G. Heilman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 676 F.Supp. 1436 (E.D.Wisc. 1987), and trade 
secret cases, Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 766 F.Supp. 670 (C.D.Ill. 1991); CVD v. 
Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). 
171 Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49, 51-52 (1993) (the copyright 
owner claimed that renting movies to hotel guests to watch in there rooms infringes the public performance 
right). Id. at  64 (the lawsuit was not objectively baseless even though the copyright owner lost a summary 
judgment motion)  
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the purpose of such litigation is to extract a settlement payment not to exclude a rival. In 
antitrust parlance, there is no antitrust injury and no attempt to monopolize a market. The 
sham litigation theory applies to lawsuits that have an anti-competitive effect because of 
the cost and delay created by the litigation; it does not apply to lawsuits that have an anti-
competitive effect because a plaintiff succeeds in enforcing a weak IP right.173 The 
Walker Process theory has limited utility because it is difficult to prove fraudulent patent 
procurement.174 Where Section Two applies, it probably deters the most egregious 
lawsuits in which a monopolist gets a flimsy patent and litigates an entrant out of 
existence, but it does not have much effect otherwise. Section Two claims based on sham 
litigation are very common,175 but almost never successful.176  
                                                                                                                                                 
172 Cite. Attempts to monopolize are also actionable. 
173 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine holds that petitioning the government to receive benefits at the expense 
of a competitor is protected speech and therefore immune from antitrust scrutiny. See Eastern Railroad v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 508 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (19xx). In 
this context, petitioning includes litigation as well as lobbying. See California Motor Transport Co. v. 
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity does not extend to sham 
litigation. Sham litigation is defined in terms of the objective of the litigation. “[T]he sham exception to 
Noerr encompasses situations in which persons use the governmental process as opposed to the outcome of 
that process—as an anticompetitive weapon. A classic example is the filing of frivolous objections to the 
license applications of a competitor, with no expectation of achieving denial of the license but simply in 
order to impose expense and delay.” See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 111 S. Ct. 1344 
(1991); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982) (asking whether a lawsuit 
can be justified based on likely remedies rather than being profitable because of the cost of the lawsuit to a 
competitor). See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §11.3, 11-26 (2002) 
(“Some courts have held that Noerr immunity either does not apply or is easier to overcome where the 
intellectual property owner is accused of filing a pattern of suits, rather than just one.”) 
174 Cite. 
175 See HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 174, at §11.1, 11-2 (anticompetitive litigation was the subject of 
more 100 reported decisions from 1993 to 2000) Myers, supra note 22, at 565 (increased volume of sham 
litigation). 
176 Section Two liability requires: clear and convincing evidence of a bad faith patent suit; specific intent to 
monopolize the relevant market; and a dangerous probability of success. See Handgards I, 601 F.2d at 994-
96. Ethicon was held liable for an antitrust violation for bringing the infringement claim in bad faith. The 
jury awarded $3.6 million in damages, $1.1 million in attorney fees, and $3 million in post-judgment 
interest. Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1979) HOVENKAMP, ET AL., supra note 
174, at §5.4, 5-41(2002) (court carefully scrutinize antitrust claims based on sham IP litigation) id. at  
§11.2, 11-14 (both Walker Process and Handgards suits usually fail); Nissen, supra note 18, at 66 (“[T]he 
odds of prevailing on an antitrust claim [based on a frivolous patent infringement suit] are not good.”) 
Instead of a federal antitrust claim, victims of anti-competitive suits might prevail using a state law cause of 
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IV. SCREENING OUT WEAK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWSUITS 
A. Better Examination at the Patent and Trademark Office 
 Better screening of putative IP rights at an early stage would certainly help 
mitigate the problems of opportunistic and anti-competitive lawsuits, but there is little 
hope for this method of control. Copyright and trade secret rights are not subjected to any 
examination; copyright has a minimal registration procedure. Thus, there is no 
opportunity to use agency resources to screen out weak copyright and trade secret claims. 
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examines patents and trademarks, and could do 
a better job of screening out weak claims, but various factors limit the performance of the 
agency.177 A fundamental limitation on trademark examination is that plaintiffs can 
protect unregistered marks under federal law.178  
 The ex parte nature of examination restricts the information available to 
examiners and poses the chief obstacle to high quality examination at the PTO.179 Patent 
applicants and their attorneys have a duty to disclose information relevant to 
patentability. A patent owner risks facing a defense of inequitable conduct which leaves a 
patent unenforceable if he or she was not candid with the PTO. Despite these incentives, 
critics charge that many patents are granted that would not have been granted if the PTO 
had better information.180  
                                                                                                                                                 
action. See id., at 66-67 (explaining the availability of a state unfair competition law cause of action against 
a party who brings a bad faith patent infringement claim). 
177 See Rai, supra note 89, at 203 (flood of low quality gene patents); Mark A. Lemley, supra, note 22, at 
1495 (noting criticism of PTO for failing to effectively examine business method patents); Michael J. 
Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J. L. & POLICY 309 (2002). 
178 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (finding infringement in case involving 
unregistered trade dress). 
179 See Lemley, supra, note 22, at 1500 (applicants are not obliged to search for prior art). 
180 John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 
2001 ILL.L.REV. 305 (potential inequitable conduct liability is not sufficient to induce candid disclosure to 
the Patent Office); SHULMAN, supra note 22, at 59- 60, 69 (Compton won a controversial patent on search 
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 Examination suffers from three other problems. First, examiners have a financial 
incentive to process applications quickly.181 The patent prosecution process moves so 
quickly that the average patent gets only 18 hours of review.182 Second, opening new 
fields to patentable subject matter has resulted in low patent quality because the prior art 
needed to examine an application is not available, and third, finding trained examiners in 
a new field is difficult. These problems are acute in the fields of software and business 
methods.183 Some of these problems could be cured by increasing the resources available 
to the PTO,184 but there is a strong argument to limit the resources spent on examination: 
most patents and many registered trademarks have little or no value, therefore, a thorough 
examination of every application would be wasteful.185 
B. Stricter Standards for Certain Intellectual Property Rights 
 Examination, pre-trial, and post-trial control measures are not always sufficient to 
effectively control opportunistic and anti-competitive litigation. It may be appropriate to 
complement these control measures by restricting certain IP rights.  Many of the cases 
reporting instances of possible opportunistic or anti-competitive litigation come from 
specific kinds of subject matter that could be targeted for special treatment: business 
method patents, trade dress protection of product design, and copyrights on art 
reproductions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
technology that is a basic feature of multimedia databases. The PTO reexamined the Compton patent on its 
own initiative and invalidated all of the claims.) 
181 See Rai, supra note  89, at 218.  
182 See Lemley, supra, note 22, at 1500 (2001). 
183 Cohen and Lemley. John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B. C. L. Rev. 1139 
(1999);, Merges, supra note 3, at x; Meurer, supra note 178. 
184 Merges, supra note 3, at 606-09 (suggesting improved incentives and training for examiners would 
increase patent quality). 
185 See Lemley, supra, note 22, at 1510-11 (2001) (limited patent examination is the best policy because 
improved “examination procedures will largely be wasted on examining the ninety-five percent of patents 
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 The existence of business method patents generates a substantial hazard of 
opportunistic lawsuits because of the rapid pace of invention and the heterogeneous 
character of the inventors in this field. Business method users inadvertently expose 
themselves to opportunistic suits because independent invention is likely, and 
surveillance of research activity by other potential inventors is difficult. Consequently, 
many business method users make a commitment to a business method before they learn 
that the method might be covered by a patent or patent application. Congress responded 
to this problem by creating a first inventor defense, but the scope of this defense is too 
narrow to be very helpful.186 Several commentators have called for the reversal of State 
Street187 the recent case that allowed business method patents,188 less drastic reforms 
have been suggested including a patent opposition procedure189 and a stricter 
nonobviousness standard for business method inventions.190 
 Anti-competitive trade dress litigation based on product design is especially 
worrisome. Manufacturers expose themselves to trade dress liability because it is hard to 
identify unregistered trade dress, and it is hard to decide whether trade dress is distinctive 
and non-functional.191 Mindful of the danger of anti-competitive lawsuits, the courts have 
recently reversed the long-running expansion of trade dress protection under Section 
                                                                                                                                                 
that will either never be used, or will be used in circumstances that don't crucially rely on the determination 
of validity.”) 
186 The defense excuses from infringement inventors who choose to practice their new business method as a 
trade secret instead of patenting it. 
187 Cite. 
188 Rochelle Dreyfuss, Santa Clara L. Rev.; Thomas, supra note 184; Meurer, supra note 178. 
189 Merges, supra note 3, at x. 
190 Meurer, supra note 178. 
191 In order for trade dress to be protected under § 43(a), a plaintiff must prove it is used in commerce, non-
functional, and distinctive. 
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43(a) of the Lanham Act.192 Critics of trade dress protection of product design have 
called for its abolition.193 A more moderate proposal limits relief for infringement to an 
informational labeling requirement.194 
 Copyright infringement suits based on art reproductions also pose a significant 
anti-competitive risk. The first party to make an art reproduction like the plastic bank 
featured in Batlin might deter imitators because of uncertainty inherent in a weak 
originality requirement195 and the cost of copyright litigation.196 To reduce this risk courts 
and commentators insist on a rigorous application of originality that would leave some art 
reproductions unprotected by copyright.197 
CONCLUSION 
 It is useful to think of the intellectual property system both as a system of 
property rights that promotes the production of valuable information and as a system of 
government regulation that unintentionally promotes socially harmful rent-seeking. This 
Article analyzes methods of controlling rent-seeking costs associated with opportunistic 
and anti-competitive IP lawsuits. My thinking is guided to some extent by the analysis of 
                                                 
192 See McCarthy, supra note 64, at 46; WalMart v. Samara Bros., x U.S. x (x); TrafFix Devices v. 
Marketing Displays, x U.S. x (2001). 
193 See Dinwoodie, supra note 60, at 663 n. 205 (collecting citations to scholars and judges who would 
exclude trademark protection of product design). 
194 Id. at 739 (favoring protection of functional and distinctive product design as long as informational 
labeling relieves the defendant of liability for copying the design); J.H. Reichman, Past and Current Trends 
in the Evoloution of a Design Protection Law — A Comment, 4 FORD. INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
387, 395 (1993) (explaining the value of labeling to avoid confusing trade dress). 
195 Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, University of Chicago, John M. Olin Law & 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 151, 18 available at: 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html (emphasizing evidentiary problems created by a weak 
originality standard). 
196 Id. at 20. 
197 L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 394 F.Supp. 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (“To extend copyrightability to 
minuscule variations would simply put a weapon for harassment in the hands of mischievous copiers intent 
on appropriating and monopolizing public domain work.”); Lichtman, supra note 196 at 1 (The originality 
requirement (as well as the fixation requirement and the merger doctrine) are “best understood as tools that 
exclude from the copyright regime cases for which the costs of litigation would be intolerably high.”) 
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procedural measures for controlling frivolous litigation, and analysis of antitrust reforms 
designed to control strategic abuse of antitrust law. These analogies lead me to focus on 
pre-trial and post-trial control measures that reduce the credibility of weak IP lawsuits. I 
conclude that intellectual property courts show some awareness of the value of fee-
shifting and summary judgment as tools for controlling opportunistic and anti-
competitive lawsuits. Courts display less awareness of the need to restrict preliminary 
injunctions or encourage declaratory judgments as control measures. Antitrust suits have 
only a limited role in deterring the most egregious anti-competitive conduct. Besides 
attacking the credibility of weak lawsuits, it is probably desirable to eliminate the threat 
of some kinds of IP lawsuits entirely. This could be accomplished by eliminating or 
restricting IP rights such as business method patents, trade dress protection of product 
configuration and design, and copyright protection of art reproductions. In other words, it 
may be desirable to curtail the “standing” of parties who own IP rights that generate a 
substantial threat of opportunistic or anti-competitive litigation with little corresponding 
benefit in terms of productive incentives.198 
 
 
                                                 
198 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business? 16 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 263, 274 (2000) “…business methods are 
not the only example of newly created or expanded intellectual property rights. There is also database 
protection, dilution, blurring, cybersquatting, and misappropriation. A strange aspect to many of these 
expansions is that they occur without any specific thought given to the need for protection.” 
